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OPERATION MARKET GARDEN 
STRATEGIC MASTERSTROKE OR BATTLE OF THE EGOS? 
by 
Dr. Martin Watts, BA (Hons.) PhD, Sessional Lecturer, Canterbury Christ Church 
University. June 2012. 
 
In September 1944, the allies undertook the largest ever airborne operation, apparently in 
an effort to capitalise on the German withdrawal from France and Belgium and end the war 
in the west by encircling the Ruhr. But what really lay behind this most audacious and 
daring attempt to finish the war in 1944? Inter allied rivalry, at the highest levels of military 
command, and the pursuit of personal ambition, will be discussed to reveal some of the 
reasons for failure and the post war bitterness it engendered. 
By 1944, the Anglo – American alliance against Germany was firmly focussed on 
the invasion of France. The subsequent success of the landings in Normandy was 
recognised by Eisenhower, Bradley and Patton as owing much to Montgomery, and the 
allies succeeded in reaching all of their objectives within the 90 days of the Overlord plan. 
The victory in Normandy, which inflicted more casualties upon German forces than in 
North Africa and Stalingrad, might be viewed as the pinnacle of Montgomery’s 
achievements in the Second World War.  Nevertheless, the failure to take Caen within 24 
hours of the landings, as originally planned, and the consequent slowness of the advance 
in the eastern sector – which created the time and space for the American advance from 
the west - began to sow the seeds of allied ill-feeling relatively early in the campaign.  This 
was an unnecessary situation, borne out of Montgomery’s success in maintaining the 
siege of Caen, thus deliberately attracting German reserves towards the British and 
Canadian forces. In response to press criticism of the British ‘stickiness’ around the city, 
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Montgomery, who can hardly have been expected to reveal the truth about this strategy to 
create the conditions for an American breakout from the west, nevertheless 
overemphasised the importance of the attacks on Caen. This, rather unfortunately, created 
an impression of failure rather than success, effectively reinforcing the unfair national 
stereotypes that became associated with the ‘defensive’ attributes of the British and the 
‘offensive’ qualities of the Americans. Montgomery’s own reputation had been built upon 
the careful preparation of his forces in readiness for the execution of a meticulously 
planned operation. At Caen, this helped to obscure the flexibility he demonstrated upon 
realising that the swift taking of the city would actually undermine his overall strategy for 
the battle of Normandy. By insisting that everything always went according to plan, and 
concentrating on the importance of Caen as an objective, Montgomery, to some extent, 
came close to being hoisted by his own petard. As indicated above, the result of this 
episode, as far as the allies were concerned, was to lay the foundations of a certain 
amount of ill feeling between senior commanders.  In the words of Omar Bradley, the 
commander of the US 12th Army Group: 
… the frustration they (the British) experienced here at Caen produced an  
extreme sensitivity to Patton’s speedy advance across France. In setting  
the stage for our breakout the British were forced to endure the barbs of  
critics who shamed them for failing to push out as vigorously as the  
Americans did. The intense rivalry that afterward strained relations between  
the British and American commands might be said to have sunk its  
psychological roots into that passive mission of the British on the  
beachhead. i 
With the breakout from Normandy complete, the Allied armies in France now found 
themselves in a similar situation to the German forces who had reached Abbeville in 1940, 
where the lack of an immediate follow up plan prevented them from making the most, in 
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strategic terms, of this success. Given the scale and increasing speed of the German 
retreat this is hardly surprising. Three significant problems now presented themselves to 
the allied direction of the war in the west, whilst Bradley’s and Montgomery’s troops were 
racing through eastern France. Firstly, the question of command of the land forces, 
secondly, the determination of strategy and thirdly, the problem of logistics and supply. 
The selection of Montgomery tasked, as land force commander under Eisenhower, 
with the ultimate planning and execution of Overlord, in addition to commanding the British 
and Canadian 21st Army Group, was a sound acknowledgment of his ability and 
experience. As mentioned earlier, all of the American commanders, including Eisenhower, 
attributed the success of this massive undertaking to Montgomery. His appointment as 
land force commander, however, was only ever meant to be of a temporary nature, lasting 
until Eisenhower’s SHAEF was firmly established in France, concomitant with the 
activation of the US 12th Army Group as the equivalent of the 21st Army Group. The basis 
of this command structure lay in a meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt at 
Casablanca in 1943, where they had agreed the principle that command would lie with the 
nation that contributed the majority of forces.  The forthcoming arrival of further American 
armies into France, the combat and command experience gained by the Americans during 
and after Overlord, ensured that, on the 1 September 1944, when Eisenhower himself 
added this field command to his overall responsibilities as Supreme Commander, 
Montgomery stepped down. To Montgomery, this decision was militarily unsound. In 
common with his British superior, Alanbrooke, Montgomery had a poor opinion of 
American generalship and military doctrine, and particularly decried Eisenhower’s lack of 
command experience. For example, Alanbrooke’s diary entry of 27 July 1944 contains the 
following passage: 
There is no doubt that Ike is all out to do all he can to maintain the best of  
relations between British and Americans, but it is equally clear that Ike  
knows nothing about strategy and is quite unsuited to the post of Supreme  
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Commander as far as running the strategy of the war is concerned!ii 
Alanbrooke and Montgomery may, militarily speaking, have had a point, but 
Montgomery in particular failed to appreciate the bigger political picture, and the realities of 
running an allied coalition made up of forces subject to the control of two independent 
democracies. For as much as Montgomery was championed by Alanbrooke, so was 
Eisenhower by Marshall, and it is of interest to note that both Alanbrooke and Marshall 
believed that the command of the invasion should have been theirs, but neither Churchill 
nor Roosevelt would let go of their chief military advisers. Alanbrooke and Marshall had 
clashed over strategy, and Alanbrooke had won the initial arguments by insisting on 
putting the Mediterranean first but, by the end of August 1944, the preponderance of 
American forces had begun to weaken British influence. The truth was Britain and the 
Empire were running out of resources, especially manpower, just as the millions of US 
soldiers recruited and trained under Marshall were being brought to bear. The American 
public (not forgetting that it was also an election year) would not accept the continuation of 
Montgomery’s command of their armies in North West Europe. 
As interesting as the management of senior personalities may be, the lives of the 
soldiers serving at the front would be ultimately dependent on the strategy decided upon 
by these personalities. Without a post Overlord plan, the development of strategy revolved 
around the progress of Montgomery’s and Bradley’s army groups, in the north and centre 
respectively, and the military doctrines of the American and British leadership. 
Unfortunately, the two doctrines concerned were diametrically opposed and, with 
command and the majority of forces employed, it was inevitable that Eisenhower would 
choose a broad front strategy that essentially entailed attacking along the whole length of 
his front, from the coast to Switzerland, taking the Siegfried Line head on and probing for 
weaknesses before committing forces to a decisive crossing of the Rhine. Such a notion 
appalled Montgomery, as he felt sure that this would guarantee that the war could not be 
finished in 1944, and would result in greater casualties. His view, based on the principle of 
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concentration of forces, was that a thrust be made into Germany from North of the 
Ardennes, securing Antwerp, outflanking the Siegfried Line and be strong enough to 
bounce a crossing of the Rhine before enveloping the Ruhr and destroying German 
industry. This is often referred to as a narrow thrust, with the obvious disadvantage that its 
flanks would be exposed to superior German forces, but what Montgomery initially argued 
for was a combined effort of both his and Bradley’s army groups advancing north of the 
Ardennes. It is difficult to describe a combined force of this size, effectively four armies, as 
‘a narrow thrust’, but Eisenhower’s fears of flank exposure are not to be dismissed. In their 
book, ‘A War to be Won’, Murray and Millett convincingly argue that, had Hitler deployed 
his final reserves after the allies had crossed the Rhine in a concentrated thrust, then this 
could have been decisively beaten.iii The Supreme Commander, therefore, was faced with 
weighing the risks of making an immediate drive in the north and attempting to end the war 
in 1944, against the more cautious, and prudent, strategy of the broad front. For his own 
part, Montgomery thought the Saar, to the south, could be left to the US forces advancing 
north from the landings in the south of France, thus permitting more resources to be 
allocated to his northern drive. 
 Montgomery first argued his proposals with Bradley in a meeting on the 17 August 
and thought the latter agreed but, by the time he met with both Bradley and Eisenhower, 
six days later, two things had become clear. Eisenhower was going to assume direct 
command of the land campaign from the 1 September, and was prepared to order the 
execution of the broad front strategy, directing the 21st Army Group to Antwerp and on to 
Germany through the coastal plain, whilst the US 12th Army Group were directed to the 
centre towards Metz and the Saar.  Montgomery then spoke to Eisenhower alone and, in 
the words of Eisenhower’s biographer, Ambrose, proceeded ‘to deliver a patronizing 
lecture on elementary strategy that a Sandhurst or West Point cadet would have found 
insulting.’iv 
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Eisenhower, exhibiting a great deal of patience, tried to explain to Montgomery the 
bigger picture as he saw it, and emphasised the importance he placed on the early seizure 
of Antwerp. This had become a vital allied objective, with the American and British armies, 
in mid-late August, remaining almost completely dependent on supplies landed about 400 
miles to their rear. Prodigious efforts were being made to supply the armies by road, a 
situation not helped by the allied air forces necessary destruction of the railway 
infrastructure in northern France. Montgomery now took the opportunity to explain that, as 
he considered he did not have sufficient forces to achieve his objectives, he required 
twelve American divisions, from Bradley’s armies, to cover his right flank, so that he could 
concentrate his own resources on Antwerp. Because of the supply situation, he also 
required Eisenhower to stop supplies to Patton, operating in the south of Bradley’s 
command, so that he had sufficient to guarantee success in the north.   Eisenhower, of 
course, could not agree. Subjected to lobbying by Bradley and Patton, he realised that he 
could not have a situation where Bradley would have been left with one army under his 
command whilst Montgomery ‘acquired’ the other. But he was keen, under his own 
directives, to secure Antwerp and the other objectives he had set for 21st Army Group, and 
so he compromised, in a further directive issued on the 29 August. This compromise did 
not amount to much by way of concession to Montgomery, and may owe more to 
Eisenhower’s balancing act than sound military judgment, but he did give Montgomery’s 
advance priority and a degree of co-ordination over the left wing of Bradley’s forces. One 
of the long standing criticisms of Eisenhower was his exercise of compromise and, in this 
instance, the use of the word ‘co-ordination’, as opposed to control, can be seen as 
providing a basis for ambiguity and further misunderstanding between his subordinate 
commanders. Eisenhower’s biographer, who considered it missed the point, has succinctly 
addressed this charge:  
Montgomery tended to hear what he wanted to hear, read what he wanted  
to read; Eisenhower tended to seek out words or phrases that would  
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appease. There was, consequently, a consistent misunderstanding  
between the two men. Nevertheless, Eisenhower never yielded on the  
two main points, command and single thrust, not in August and  
September 1944, nor again when they were raised in January and  
March 1945. v   
 
Notwithstanding any misunderstanding, as far as this discussion is concerned, the 
most positive (for Montgomery) part of the compromise was the allocation of the First 
Allied Airborne Army (FAA) to 21st Army Group. Under Montgomery’s direction, the FAAA 
began, almost immediately, to plan several of what became abortive missions to assist 21st 
Army Group’s advance, before Market Garden itself was carried out. The significance of 
the FAAA being made available to Montgomery, is that it represented Eisenhower’s sole 
strategic reserve, and can be said, therefore, to demonstrate both the importance given to 
Montgomery’s objectives by the supreme commander, and the way in which the broad 
front strategy was using up most of the available troops. It consisted of two American 
airborne divisions, the 82nd and 101st, both of which had been in action during Overlord, 
and the British 1st airborne division, 1st Polish independent parachute brigade and the 52nd 
(Lowland) airportable division. All of these units, with the exception of the 52nd, were to 
take part in Market Garden.  
In any event, Eisenhower duly took over the land forces on the 1st September, and 
Montgomery reverted to command the 21st Army Group consisting of British and Canadian 
forces. An attempt was made to assuage his feelings by promotion to Field Marshal, with 
effect from the date of his stepping down, but as this meant he now technically outranked 
Eisenhower, it merely added to his irritation and discomfort. As noted above, it was to take 
all of Eisenhower’s man management skills to keep Montgomery in the allied team – quite 
a feat when he also had similar problems with Patton, who had previously outranked both 
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his immediate commander, Bradley, and Eisenhower and had extensive combat 
experience.  
Meanwhile, Patton, following his own lobbying of Eisenhower had, under Bradley, 
pushed forward with his own army, thus putting pressure on the supreme commander to 
maintain his allocation of supplies, thereby threatening to derail the support that was being 
offered to Montgomery. Eisenhower, once again, was forced into a position where he had 
to reaffirm the priority given to Montgomery in the North, which order only had the effect of 
provoking Patton to use his supplies to continue to move east, fully prepared to allow his 
forward armour to operate until their fuel was exhausted. 
As with the British leadership’s view of Eisenhower’s military capabilities, Patton 
was equally uncompromising in his self-confidence. In his diary, after being subordinated, 
in 1943, to Montgomery in Sicily, he wrote:  
The U.S. is getting gypped… .. On a study of ‘form’, especially in the  
higher command, we are licked. Churchill runs this war… the thing I  
must do is retain my self-confidence. I have greater ability than these  
other people and it comes from, for lack of a better word, what we  
must call greatness of soul based on a belief-an unshakeable belief-  
in my destiny. The U.S. must win – not as an ally, but as a conqueror.  
If I can find my duty I can do it. I must. This is one of the bad days.vi  
 
Regardless of Eisenhower’s decisions and Montgomery’s and Patton’s behaviour, 
the critical factor limiting the scope of the allied advance was logistics. The speed of the 
breakout from Normandy left both armies dependent on overstretched lines of 
communication, leading to a virtual halt in the first week of September, with Montgomery 
up to the Belgian/Dutch border and Patton up to the River Meuse. 
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It was at this juncture, with Eisenhower’s directive in mind and in possession of the 
First Allied Airborne Army, Montgomery stunned his allies with the plan for Market Garden, 
which Eisenhower approved at another fraught meeting on the 10th September. In the 
words of Bradley:  
Had the pious teetotaling Montgomery wobbled into SHAEF with a  
hangover, I could not have been more astonished than I was by the  
daring adventure he proposed. For, in contrast to the conservative  
tactics Montgomery ordinarily chose, the Arnhem attack was to be  
made over a 60-mile carpet of airborne troops. Although I never  
reconciled myself to the venture, I freely concede that Monty’s plan  
for Arnhem was one of the most imaginative of the war.’vii  
 
Eisenhower’s approval of Market Garden was unequivocal. ‘At the September 10 
conference in Brussels Field Marshal Montgomery was authorised to defer the clearing out 
of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the bridgehead I wanted.’ viii Eisenhower’s 
desire, in furtherance of the broad front, was to acquire a Rhine bridgehead in the Arnhem 
area, so as to provide an extension of the line providing security for Antwerp, and giving a 
base for the later outflanking of the Siegfried line in the north. 
Once again, the approval of this plan meant that US forces would need to be halted 
and realigned and more supplies diverted to Montgomery; a situation that did not stop 
Patton, with Bradley’s connivance, from pushing on himself. In his own words:  
On the twelfth (September), we had a meeting at Twelfth Army Group 
Headquarters on the question of supply. As Colonel R.W. Wilson, G-4  
of First Army, was there, I watched my step very carefully. He had been  
my G-4 in the II Corps. We learned that Montgomery had told Eisenhower  
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that the delay in the advance of the American VII Corps had been due to  
lack of gasoline. This was not the case; it was simply another instance  
of Monty trying to force everything to the north to attack the Low Countries  
and the Ruhr. If the High Command yielded to his blandishments, there  
would be nothing left for the Third Army but hold the west bank of the  
Moselle defensively… …However, I felt that could we force a crossing,  
this unfortunate situation could be prevented, and Bradley gave me  
until the night of the fourteenth to do it.ix 
 
Patton’s troops made good his promise to Bradley then, on the 17th, the very day 
that Market Garden was launched, Patton later recorded that:  
Bradley called to say that Monty wanted all the American troops to stop  
so that he, Monty, could make a “dagger thrust with the Twenty-First  
Army Group at the heart of Germany.” Bradley said he thought it would  
be more like a “butter-knife thrust.” In order to avoid such an eventuality,  
it was evident that the Third Army should get deeply involved at once,  
so I asked Bradley not to call me until after dark on the nineteenth. x 
 
The Third Army did get across the Moselle but, by the 23rd September, with 
hardening German resistance and supply problems, Patton was forced to assume the 
defensive. Two days later, the remnants of the British First Airborne Division and the 
Polish Parachute Brigade were evacuated back across the Lower Rhine, heralding the 
failure of Market Garden. Both allied army groups were now faced with hard fighting in the 
Ardennes and through the Hurtgen and Reichswald forests, with heavy casualties, before 
a Rhine crossing could be attempted in March 1945. 
11 | P a g e  
 
When examining the aftermath of the victory in Normandy, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that both Montgomery and Patton were seeking to subvert Eisenhower’s plans, 
by forcing him to choose, or at least reinforce, a single line of advance, relying on his 
apparent willingness to compromise. Later, and as recorded earlier, Eisenhower insisted 
that he wanted to proceed with Market Garden in order to get up to the Rhine before 
winter, and to secure Antwerp. As for Montgomery, he claimed that Market Garden was 
‘ninety per cent successful’, but the defeat at Arnhem left a salient through to Nijmegen 
with dreadful consequences for the non-liberated Dutch to the west. The failure to take the 
northern bank of the Scheldt meant that the approaches to Antwerp remained in German 
hands until October and allowed much of the German Fifteenth Army to escape into the 
Netherlands. Ironically, it was these troops that were able to make frequent attacks across 
the airborne corridor, during the nine days of Market Garden, a factor that played a large 
part in the decision to evacuate the British and Polish troops stuck over the Lower Rhine at 
Oosterbeek, east of Arnhem. 
After the war, many Generals and historians considered the failure to open Antwerp 
in September to be a major mistake in allied strategy. This widely held opinion would 
seem, therefore, to support the view that Market Garden was designed to ensure that 
Montgomery took the lead in the invasion of Germany. However, Bradley’s remark about a 
‘butter-knife like thrust’ rings true; the force that could have been put across the Lower 
Rhine, after the series of ‘compromise’ meetings Eisenhower held with his commanders in 
late August and early September, was not of the forty division scale originally proposed. 
Indeed, by the time that the final decision to launch Market Garden was taken, on the 10 
September, Montgomery appreciated that there was no immediate prospect of pushing 
through to Berlin via the Ruhr. In a note of a conversation, in March 1946, with Chester 
Wilmot, the war correspondent, Montgomery said:  
I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] 
 that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead over  
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the Rhine before the winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out  
in the New Year. By the time Market Garden was undertaken…  
… its significance was more tactical than strategic.xi 
 
In spite of this, and the earlier references to the 10 September meeting, Eisenhower later 
wrote that he took the opportunity, at this meeting, to explain that ‘ without railway bridges 
over the Rhine and ample stockages of supplies on hand, there was no possibility of 
maintaining a force in Germany capable of penetrating to its capital.’xii The implication is 
clear; Eisenhower considered Montgomery to be still insisting on the shutdown of all other 
operations to allow him the wherewithal to drive on to Berlin. This may certainly have been 
the intention of the British commander after Normandy but, by the time Market Garden was 
ordered, it was apparent that both commanders would have to settle for a bridgehead over 
the Lower Rhine at best. 
 Once again, the situation described in the previous paragraph only serves to show 
how the culture of inter-allied misunderstanding, bought about by the need for 
compromise, clouded the strategic picture. Significantly, the principal British personality 
responsible for smoothing over relations with the Americans, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, 
Major General de Guingand, was absent throughout much of this period, on sick leave in 
the United Kingdom. De Guingand, who managed through his own personal endeavours to 
keep his boss in the job after the worst of the latter’s outbursts to Eisenhower, was very 
much respected by the Americans. The Supreme Commander later wrote of him, ’He lived 
the code of the Allies and his tremendous capacity, ability, and energy were devoted to the 
co-ordination of plan and detail that was absolutely essential to victory.’xiii As far as the 
concept of Market Garden was concerned, however, De Guingand was opposed to the 
venture, principally on the grounds of the time of year and the supply situation. With 
autumn mists due anytime in September he regarded this as too high a risk for an 
operation so dependent on the air element, and he understood, given logistics and the 
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political situation, that the broad thrust strategy, advocated by Eisenhower, made more 
sense at this time. Due to his absence, it will never be known what effect, if any, his 
counsel might have had on Montgomery’s plans at the time, but their difference of opinion 
was to become a major factor in the post war battle of the memoirs.  
 Despite their long (since Montgomery’s arrival in the Middle East in 1942) and 
successful association, Montgomery’s failure to offer de Guingand a suitable position in the 
post war army, left the latter to pursue business interests and write one of the first memoirs 
of the second world war. De Guingand’s book, Operation Victory was published in January 
1947, thus making public his objections to Market Garden and views on what was to 
become the great controversy over ‘broad front versus narrow thrust’.  In defence of 
Montgomery, his erstwhile Chief of Administration, Major General Miles Graham, wrote to 
the Times, in February 1947, to take his former colleague to task, and dispute the need to 
give priority to the opening of the port at Antwerp. Such is the significance of this 
intervention that no apologies are offered for the reproduction of the majority of the text as 
follows:  
General de Guingand bases his opposition to Field-Marshal Montgomery’s  
plan broadly on: a) tactical and political objections; (b) administrative  
difficulties. As to the former I am not justified in expressing an opinion,  
although I can hardly believe that Field Marshal Montgomery would have  
been anxious to commit himself, when final victory was already in sight,  
to a course of action which was likely to lead to a tactical disaster. As to  
the latter, I was quite confident at the time (nor would Field Marshal  
Montgomery have pressed his views unless he had been assured on  
this point) that a deep thrust to the heart of Germany was administratively  
feasible. General de Guingand appears to forget that at the period at  
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which the advance would have taken place we were no longer based,  
as he suggests, on the Normandy beaches. The port of Dieppe was  
opened on September 5 and by the end of the month was dealing  
with over 6,000 tons per day. Ostend was captured on September 9  
and opened on the 28th of the same month. Boulogne and Calais were  
captured on September 22 and 30 respectively. Meanwhile the depots  
on the Normandy beaches were being rapidly cleared by rail and road,  
and the new Advance Base established in central and northern Belgium.  
An additional 17 General Transport companies with a lift of some 8,000  
tons and preloaded with petrol and supplies were borrowed from the War  
Office, and arrived in the latter half of September and early October. I  
personally have no doubt from a purely administrative point of view that,  
based as we were on the Channel ports, it would have been possible to  
carry out successfully the operation which Field Marshal Montgomery  
desired.xiv 
 
Montgomery, to his credit, and after going into print with his own account in Normandy to 
the Baltic, and not labouring the point that his Chief Administrative Officer had advised him 
of the feasibility of the development of operations beyond Market Garden, then wrote to De 
Guingand advising:  
I indulged in no controversy. You opened the controversy in your book;  
Miles replied; I remain silent and always will…’ Interestingly, he then went  
on to state, Actually, if I were to disclose what took place between Ike and  
myself in my caravan at Tac HQ at GACE, when I forced from Ike the real  
15 | P a g e  
 
reasons for the broad front, I could shoot everyone sky high. We were alone  
and no one else can ever know the true story of our talk. xv  
The meeting with Eisenhower that Montgomery referred to in his letter was that of the 10 
September, and it is understood that he believed the ‘real reasons’ to be more concerned 
with political rather than military matters, as previously discussed. Sadly, silence was not 
to remain the order of the day, and the broad thrust and narrow front controversy grew into 
an argument that, by focussing on whether or not the war had been needlessly prolonged, 
destroyed, in the 1950’s, the relationship between the erstwhile Field Marshal and 
Supreme Commander, who by now had become the President of the United States. 
The debate involving Operation Market Garden and the broad thrust, narrow front 
controversy continues to be discussed in the persistent stream of publications about this 
daring undertaking. It was, and remains, an operation that captures the imagination and 
focuses attention on the realities of democratic allied co-operation, and the priorities and 
qualities needed to fight a war under coalition conditions. Argument will, no doubt, 
continue, but the essential point is the priority that has to be given to maintaining a 
common cause in the face of a ruthless and efficient enemy. When the major partners of 
the coalition in a campaign, such as North West Europe in 1944-45, are democracies, with 
citizen armies and a free press, it is unrealistic to assume that public opinion can be 
discounted. Whereas Stalin used the competing egos of his two leading Generals to get 
results, the western, democratic, allies chose compromise in September 1944, for the sake 
of unity. 
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